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Decarbonizing the Global Energy System 
ARNULF GRUBLER and NEBOJSA NAKICENOVIC 
ABSTRACT 
The study analyzes the long-term decarbonization of the global energy system, i.e ., the decrease of the 
carbon emissions per unit of primary energy. Decarbonization appears as a continuous and persistent trend 
throughout the world, albeit occurring at very slow rates of approximately 0.3"7o per year. The study also discusses 
driving forces of the associated structural changes in energy systems such as technological change . Decarbonization 
also occurs at the level of energy end use and trends for final energy are shown. The quest for higher flexibility, 
convenience, and cleanliness of energy services demanded by consumers leads to decarbonization trends in final 
energy that are more pronounced than those of the upstream energy sector. The study concludes with a discussion 
of the implications for long-term scenarios of energy-environment interactions suggesting that decarbonization 
and its driving forces may still be insufficiently captured by most models and scenarios of the long-term evolution 
of the energy system. 
Introduction 
Two important factors determine the level of energy-related C02 emissions: the 
absolute level of energy demand, and the structure of the energy system (energy supply 
and end use). In this article, we focus on a discussion of changes in the structure of energy 
supply, which historically have led to a "decarbonization" of the global energy system. 
Decarbonization means a decrease in the specific amount of carbon (or C02) emitted 
per unit of primary energy consumed. Structural changes in energy supply lead to decar-
bonization because the emission factors of different fuels vary- they are 1.25 tons of 
elemental carbon (tC) per ton oil equivalent (toe) for wood, 1.08 tC/toe for coal, 0.84 
for oil, and 0.64 for natural gas [l]. Atmospheric C02 is an important greenhouse gas 
that helps to regulate the temperature regime of our planet. Without greenhouse gases 
global mean temperature would be some 30 degrees lower, and life as we know it would 
be impossible. Anthropogenic carbon emissions leading to an increase in atmospheric 
concentration of C02 are a potential source of change in the radiative balance of the 
atmosphere resulting in possible global warming and climate change [2]. Related political 
concerns have led to a Framework Convention of Climate Change [3] that calls for 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at levels that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Hence a better understanding of 
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Fig. 1. Global primary energy consumption by source (in Gtoe): nuclear (stippled); hydro (shaded); 
gas (open); oil (feedstocks) (vertical lines); oil (horizontal lines); coal (solid); wood (diamonds). 
past decarbonization trends and of possible future conditions for reducing the carbon 
intensiveness of the global energy system is of particular interest. 
The article has the following structure. We start with a presentation of the data 
sources used for the long-term historical analysis of decarbonization. We then analyze 
long-term decarbonization trends of primary energy consumption and the main driving 
forces of the observed structural changes in energy systems such as technological change. 
We than analyze decarbonization trends for final energy, i.e., the mix of energy carriers 
actually demanded by industrial and private consumers. We conclude that the quest for 
higher flexibility, convenience, and cleanliness of energy services demanded by consumers 
leads to decarbonization trends of final energy that are more pronounced than those of the 
energy sector upstream. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis for long-term 
scenarios of energy-environment interactions, suggesting that decarbonization and its 
driving forces may still be insufficiently captured by most models and scenarios of the 
long-term evolution of the energy system. 
Historical Decarbonization Trends 
DATA SOURCES 
Figure 1 shows the growth in global primary energy use since the mid-19th century 
by primary energy source. The data set used in our subsequent analysis of energy decarbon-
ization is an update of earlier estimates of historical energy consumption by Marchetti 
and Nakicenovic [4, 5], based on BP statistics [6] for the period 1965 to 1994. Similar 
data sets have also been developed by Etemand and Luciani [7] for primary energy 
production since the beginning of 19th century and by a number of authors for energy 
consumption during the 20th century based on statistics of the League of Nations and 
later the United Nations [8-1 OJ. Such data sets have also been used for estimating historical 
carbon emissions for carbon cycle models [11, 12] and for intergenerational carbon ac-
counting [13, 14]. 
The data cover the consumption of fossil fuels in form of coal, oil, and natural gas, 
as well as the non-fossi!1 sources hydropower and nuclear energy. Hydro and nuclear 
1 Current energy systems are dominated by the use of fossil fuels. Therefore, hydropower and nuclear 
energy also entail some carbon emissions, as consumption of fossil fuels (and C02 emissions) is required for 
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are - following a customary convention in the energy industry- accounted for by the 
so-called "substitution method", i.e., as the fossil primary energy equivalent required to 
generate the same amount of electricity in a fossil fuel power plant with a current global 
average conversion efficiency of 38 .6 percent [ 15]. Because production and trade of these 
commercial energy forms are well documented (not at least because energy has always 
been a preferred object of government taxation), we estimate that our data set records 
historical energy consumption within an uncertainty range of perhaps less than ± 100/o. 
Estimates of fuelwood consumption are also included in our data set. Fuelwood was 
an important energy source of the industrialized countries during the early phase of their 
development and is important today in many developing countries. Unfortunately, the 
estimates are associated with large data uncertainties. For the period since 1961, data 
are from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization statistics [16]. For earlier 
periods we use the estimates of Marchetti and Nakicenovic [4] that are largely based on 
the work of Putnam [17]. If harvested on a sustainable basis, fuel wood does not contribute 
directly to a net accumulation of C02 in the atmosphere, i.e., forest regrowth occurs 
at least at the same rate as fuelwood consumption, absorbing released C02 from the 
atmosphere. At present, no reliable estimates exist about the fraction of fuelwood that 
is harvested sustainably. As most of fuelwood consumption is in developing countries, 
where also deforestation rates are substantial, perhaps as much as half of the global 
current fuelwood use may lead to a net accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere. Global 
fuelwood use is estimated [16] at about 0.4 Otoe (giga, or billion, tons of oil equivalent), 
or less than 5 % of total energy use. However, the related carbon fluxes are smaller when 
compared with emission estimates from land-use changes and deforestation. Current 
fuelwood use may be releasing globally some 0.5 GtC (giga, or billion tons, elemental 
carbon), compared with some 1.6 ± l GtC estimated as annual release from land-use 
changes and deforestation [2]. The cumulative historical fuelwood consumption from 
1850 to 1990 based on our data set is about 35 Otoe, which corresponds to some 44 GtC 
cumulative emissions, compared with cumulative land-use emissions of 122 ± 40 GtC 
for the same time period [2]. In view of large uncertainties associated with net atmospheric 
accumulation of carbon emissions from burning of fuelwood, we report emissions and 
carbon intensities both including and excluding fuel wood. The former case may be consid-
ered as "gross" emissions, whereas the latter may be considered as minimum estimate of 
"net" emissions contributing directly to atmospheric concentration increases. (A similar 
accounting convention is also adopted for nonenergy feedstocks, discussed below). 
Other noncommercial energy forms are not considered in our analysis, due to the 
absence of reliable estimates of current and historical consumption. They include human 
and animal work, agricultural residues and other biomass, dung, etc. Estimates in the 
literature put their current contribution to global energy consumption at between 0.5 to 
0. 7 Otoe (i.e., between 6 to 80/o of total primary energy use) [15, 18]. Associated carbon 
emissions should not generally lead to substantial atmospheric concentration increases. 
The released carbon is sequestered through renewed biomass and foodcrop growth. 
The estimates of fossil fuel consumption reported in Figure 1 and used in our analysis 
also include nonenergy feedstocks (e.g., used for manufacture of plastics). Globally, 
the manufacture of steel, cement, etc. Emissions are mainly embodied in plant and equipment, but also originate 
from plant operation (e.g., gasoline and diesel use for cars, trucks, etc.) . These emissions are difficult to determine 
accurately, especially at the global level and are of second order magnitude. In addition, emissions occur outside 
the energy sector proper (i .e ., in manufacturing or the transport sector) . These type of indirect emissions are 
not considered separately here . 
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TABLE 1 
1990 Global Primary Energy Use and Carbon Emissions (in Mtoe and MtC) 
Mtoe• Mtc• 
Coal 2,239 2,418 
Oil' 3,137 2,629 
Gas 1,768 1,133 
Nuclear' 440 
Hydrod 481 
Total commercial (1-5) 8,065 6,180 
Energy use only' 7,657 5,838 
Fuel wood 424 531 
Total (6 + 8) 8,489 
Other noncommercial energy <700 NA 
•All values refer to lower heating values (LHV). 
• For emission factors see Reference I and text. 
' Crude oil and oil products . Includes international bunker fuel and nonenergy feedstocks . 
d Substitution equivalent based on efficiency of fossil electrictiy generation of 38 .60Jo (see Reference 15). 
'Excludes 408 Mtoe (342 MtC) feedstock uses . Data source: References 15 and 28 . 
these nonenergy uses of energy (mostly oil products) amount to some 0.4 Gtoe and 
correspond to 0.3 GtC. Related carbon emissions are difficult to estimate, as atmospheric 
releases can be delayed substantially (for instance when plastic produced decades ago is 
burned in an incinerator after the end of its useful life; in case of buried wastes such 
delay times may extend even to centuries). This uncertainty, together with the fact that 
feedstocks constitute a raw material rather than an energy use, is reflected in our analysis 
by reporting numbers both including and excluding feedstock uses. This is similar to the 
concept of "gross" and "net" emissions discussed above for fuelwood use. 
Table I summarizes global energy and carbon fluxes of our data set. Data are given 
in million toe and tC respectively for the year 1990 in order to facilitate comparisons with 
other studies, notably of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [18) . 
RA TES OF DECARBONIZA TION 
For selected years, Table 2 summarizes key indicators of primary energy use, carbon 
emissions, and the resulting carbon intensities. As outlined in the previous section, we 
adopt two accounting conventions: including all energy streams and emissions ("gross" 
values), as well as excluding (sustainable) fuelwood use and nonenergy feedstocks 
("net" values). 
TABLE 2 
Global Primary Energy Use (Mtoe), Carbon Emissions (MtC), and Carbon Intensities (tC/ toe) 
Carbon 
Primary energy emissions Carbon intensity 
(Mtoe) (MtC) (tC/ toe) 
Net• Gross• Net• Gross• Net• Gross• 
1850 45 211 49 313 1.08 1.22 
1920 939 l , 173 947 1,239 1.01 1.06 
1970 4,946 5,489 3,947 4,511 0.83 0.85 
1994 7,785 8,610 5,839 6,716 0.75 0.78 
Factor increase since 1850 173 41 119 21 0.7 0.6 
OJo / year, 1850-1994 3.6 2.6 3.4 2.2 -0.3 -0.3 
• "Gross" values include all forms of energy consumption and emissions; "net" values are excluding (sustainable) 
fuelwood and nonenergy feedstock uses . 
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Fig. 2. Carbon intensities of global primary energy consumption In tC/ toe): (1) "gross" intensity 
considering all energy forms and emissions; (2) "net" intensity excluding (sustainable) fuelwood and 
non-energy feedstocks. 
The tremendous expansion of (primarily fossiJ) energy use and emissions since the 
onset of the Industrial Revolution is evident from the data. Primary energy use has 
expanded by a factor of 170, and carbon emissions by a factor of 120 in the case of net 
values and by factors of 40 and 20, respectively, in the case of gross values. During the 
1850 to 1994 period, cumulativi emissions released to the atmosphere are close to 300 
GtC. Coal is by far the dominant source (132 GtC), followed by oil (86 GtC, including 
feedstocks), fuelwood (44 GtC), and natural gas (30 GtC). 
The key observation however, is that carbon emissions have expanded at a slower 
pace than primary energy use, leading to the observed "decarbonization" of the global 
energy system. (The term "decarbonization" to our knowledge was first coined by Yoichi 
Kaya and Kenji Yamaji [19, 20] describing short-term structural change trends in OECD 
energy systems. Longer term and global analyses of decarbonization were first performed 
at IIASA [21, 22].) 
The carbon intensity of primary energy use today is some 30 to 40% lower than in 
the mid-19th century. Table 2 however also illustrates that this long-term structural change 
is rather slow with 0.3 average improvement rate per year, and nearly one order of 
magnitude lower than the rate of increase in energy use . 
Figure 2 illustrates the two decarbonization trends, calculated from our data set. 
Despite fundamental changes in both energy supply and end use (see discussion in the 
section below), decarbonization trends are surprisingly regular and nonlinear. This is a 
feature observed for many dynamic, self-organizational systems. We used a threc-
parameter logistic curve [23] to fit the data. It describes the historical development 
rather well. 
The assumption that the curve parameters are uncorrelated (and hence traditional 
measures of statistical uncertainty are applicable) cannot be supported according to De-
becker and Modis [24]. The parameter uncertainties of our estimates (using the observa-
tions over the entire period 1850to 1994), assuming a 10% dataerror and a 90% confidence 
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TABLE 3 
Decarbonization Trends: Logistic Parameters and Uncertainties 
"Gross" carbon intensity "Net" ca rbon intensity 
K (tC/ toe) 1.16-1.36 1.01-1.25 
lo (year) 2003-2011 2018-2028 
6.t (years) - 305--337 -208--228 
R' 0.998 0.991 
Where K, t0, and 6.t denote the parameters of a logistic curve, in particular the asymptote (K) , the inflection 
point (t0), and the growth rate parameter (6.t) , that denotes the time (in years) to go from 1 to 50, or (because 
of the symmetry condition) from IO to 90"7o of K. As we describe a declining trend, the parameter 6.t is negative . 
level, are derived from the look-up tables of parameter uncertainties obtained with Monte 
Carlo simulations in [24] and are given in Table 3. 
Figure 2 also suggests that decarbonization trends are continuous and without trend 
reversals, although there seems to be a certain slowdown since the early 1970s. Figure 
2 also shows that the time scales involved in decarbonization are very long indeed . If 
historical trends should continue, a phase-out of fossil fuels would occur only late in 
the 22nd century. This implies that we might be only half-way through the fossil fuel 
age. This contrasts the perceptions every since the 1950s about forthcoming resource 
depletion or a rapid technology-led transition away from fossil fuels (17, 25] (see also 
the contribution of Jean-Marie Martin in this special issue on this topic) . 
Before turning to a discussion of the driving forces of decarbonization, let us briefly 
summarize some major implications. The long-term decarbonization trends indicate that 
the global energy system is moving in the right direction . This gives reason to be cautiously 
optimistic that the process of development, and the resulting economic growth, increased 
energy needs, and emissions, could be reconciled with a precautionary policy of avoiding 
large-scale human interference with the radiative balance of the atmosphere. The task 
of controlling energy-related carbon emissions, as daunting as it may appear from today's, 
or a short-term perspective, may in fact turn out to be less obstructive if indeed an 
acceleration of long-term structural change trends is called for rather than departure in 
an entirely new direction . Conversely, it will simply not suffice to rely on "autonomous" 
structural change toward carbon-freer energy systems especially considering the slow 
historical rates of decarbonization of 0.3% per year. They are dwarfed by historical and 
anticipated future growth rates in energy use and resulting carbon emissions. Substantial 
acceleration of decarbonization will thus entail both ambitious technological and policy 
changes. Their effectiveness will depend also on our understanding of the forces that 
have led to historical rates of decarbonization and how these may evolve in future. 
Driving Forces 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Before the Industrial Revolution, the energy system relied on harnessing natural 
energy flows, and animate and human power, to provide energy services in the form of 
heat, light, and work. Power densities and availability were constrained by site-specific 
factors, with mechanical energy sources limited to draft animals, water, and windmills. 
The only form of energy conversion was from chemical energy to heat and light, through 
burning fuel wood, for example, or tallow candles. Energy consumption typically did not 
exceed 0.5 toe per capita per year. 
Two "grand transitions" have since shaped structural changes in the energy system 
at all levels . The first was initiated with a radical technological end-use innovation: the 
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Fig. 3. Structural change in global primary energy (percent shares by source). 
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steam engine powered by coal. The steam cycle represented the first conversion of fossil 
energy sources into work; it allowed the provision of energy services to be site independent, 
because coal could be transported and stored as needed; and it permitted power densities 
previously only possible in exceptional locations of abundant hydropower. Stationary 
steam engines were first introduced for lifting water from coal mines, thereby facilitating 
increased coal production. Later, they provided stationary power for what was to become 
an entirely new form of organizing production: the factory system. Mobile steam engines, 
on locomotives and steam ships, enabled the first transport revolution, as railway networks 
were extended to even the most remote locations and ships converted from sail to steam. 
Characteristic energy consumption levels during the "steam age," approximately the mid-
19th century in England, were about 2 toe per capita per year. By the turn of the 20th 
century coal had replaced traditional non-fossil energy sources and supplied virtually all 
the primary energy needs of industrialized countries. 
The second grand transition was the greatly increased diversification of both energy 
end-use technologies and energy supply sources. Perhaps the most important single inno-
vation was the introduction of electricity as the first energy carrier that can be easily 
converted to light, heat, or work at the point of end use. A second key innovation was 
the internal combustion engine, which revolutionized individual and collective mobility 
through the use of cars, buses, and aircraft. Like the transition triggered by the steam 
engine, this "diversification transition" was led by technological innovations in energy 
end use, such as the electric light bulb, the electric motor, the internal combustion engine, 
and aircraft. However, changes in energy supply have been equally far reaching. In 
particular, oil emerged from being an expensive curiosity at the end of the 19th century 
to the dominant global position it has occupied for the last 30 years. 
Figure 3 illustrates these two grand transitions by showing the changing shares of 
different primary energy sources in the global energy supply (from Figure I). The long-term 
structural changes include the long transition away from traditional renewable energy 
forms (fuelwood) toward fossil fuels; the emergence and eventual saturation of coal, 
when it supplied about two-thirds of global energy needs by the eve of World War I; 
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the introduction of oil and later on natural gas, first as a by-product of oil production 
and more recently as an energy carrier in its own right; the peak in the market share of 
oil in the 1970s; and finally a slow-down in the dynamics of change in the primary energy 
supply structure during the last two decades . This reduced dynamism may be partly due 
to the increased regulatory interest received by the energy sector in recent decades, partly 
due to oil's attractiveness for the transportation sector where demand has risen steadily, 
and partly due to a delayed switch in power generation away from coal and oil to natural 
gas (through misguided regulation). 
In essence, the historical structural changes in the global energy system were triggered 
by numerous technological changes ranging from energy supply to energy end-use. The 
transition from fuelwood to coal, from coal to oil, and more recently toward gas and other 
grid-dependent energy forms such as electricity are embedded in much more far-reaching 
transformations in the technological, economic, and institutional base of modern econo-
mies that are interrelated, interdependent, and mutually cross-enhancing [26). Freeman 
and Perez (27] (see also Chris Freeman's contribution to this special issue) have developed 
a particularly convincing metaphor to describe such changes in "techno-economic para-
digms," and it is easy to associate particular of these paradigms with its dominant energy 
system and carrier from the coal-based steam economy of the 19th century to the oil 
and petrochemical based "Fordist mass production and consumption paradigm" [27) of 
economic development since World War II. 
The "grand" energy transition have facilitated far reaching structural changes in 
employment, the spatial division of labor, and international trade. These are associated 
with modernizing traditional economic and social structures and include concurrent struc-
tural changes like industrialization, urbanization, monetization of the economy, but also 
important changes in the requirements imposed on the energy sector. The historical struc-
tural changes in energy supply in particular have led to increased energy "quality," in 
terms of flexibility, convenience, and cleanliness. Better quality together with improved 
technologies of energy end-use has been a main driver, together with economic structural 
change, for improvements in energy efficiency and aggregate energy intensities (energy 
needs per unit of economic output) . Although improvement rates can vary significantly 
over time and between different countries (see the contribution of Chris Freeman in this 
special issue), long-term aggregate improvement rates range in the order of 1 percent per 
year (15). 
In essence, our interpretation of the long-term decarbonization trend of the energy 
system is the result of a combination of continuous technological change and the quest 
toward ever higher energy quality. 
ENERGY END-USE 
In our discussion thus far we have concentrated on the decarbonization of the suppfy 
part of the energy system. We will now look at energy end use. Together with technological 
change, the drive to cleaner energy is an important factor in decarbonization along with 
changing consumer preferences and rising incomes. 
Contrary to primary energy, energy end-use statistics are much more sparse, espe-
cially concerning longer term historical data. The most systematic international statistics 
are those of the International Energy Agency [28) covering the period since 1971. These 
shorter term trends are analyzed in Figure 4. The carbon intensities of final energy use 
(i.e., of the mix of fuels actually demanded by consumers) are analyzed for selected world 
regions (as used in [15)). As for primary energy, two data sets are given including and 
excluding fuelwood and nonenergy feed-stock uses. The data are not plotted as time 
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Fig. 4. Carbon intensities of final energy versus degree of economic development (GDP per capita, 
at purchasing power parities), 1971-1991. 
trends, but as a function of the degree of economic development, measured by per capita 
GDP and adjusted for purchasing power differences for developing economies and those 
undergoing transition to a market economy (Eastern Europe and the FSU, the former 
Soviet Union). This "development metric" intends to give some insights into the longer 
term evolution of the (now) industrialized countries, that also began their development 
path many decades ago at similar levels of per capita income and energy use structures 
as are prevailing in the developing countries today. 
Three observations on Figure 4 are noteworthy: first, is the considerable heterogeneity 
between different regions; second, is the persistent trend toward lower carbon intensities 
with rising per capita income; third, are the much lower carbon intensities of final energy 
(below 0.7 tC/ toe) compared with primary energy [29]. The lower carbon intensities for 
final energy are the result of changes in the fuel structure that consumers demand (private 
and industrial alike): increasing shares of high quality energy forms like electricity, district 
heat, gas, and liquids. This trend is particularly pronounced in high-income economies. 
Conversely, the final energy consumption structure of lqw income (i.e., developing) coun-
tries is dominated by the use of solids with a high carbon content: fuelwood and coal. 
In turn, these have virtually disappeared as end-use fuels in high income countries (with 
the notable exception of some coal use in metallurgical industry) . 
The decarbonization of final energy is thus more pronounced than that of primary 
energy. This is in fact no surprise considering that the carbon intensities of primary 
energy systems are also influenced by factors such as resource endowments, trade, and 
geopolitical supply diversification considerations. To an extent, the energy sector "com-
pensates" part of the decarbonization that occurs as a function of changing economic 
and consumer preferences toward high quality fuels. Part of this is due to technological 
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reasons (e.g., electricity as an end-use fuel is carbon-free but entails emissions at the 
point of its generation); part is due to policy measures (e .g., restrictions to use clean 
natural gas in electricity generation have only recently been lifted in the United States 
and by the European Communities). Nevertheless, the persistent and converging trend 
toward cleaner fuels and lower carbon intensities that seems to accompany economic 
development is an additional reason for cautious optimism concerning continuing im-
provements in the future that could assist climate protection efforts. 
This oulbak is however shared only by comparatively few studies and scenarios of 
the future. The "mainstream" viewpoint, as formulated for instance in the scenarios of 
the IPCC, rather seems to both neglect continued shifts toward higher quality fuels in 
energy end-use and anticipate long-term stagnation or even deterioration of decarboniza-
tion of energy supply. The latter trend emerges in the scenarios primarily as a result of 
perceived resource scarcities and postulated slow development of alternative energy 
sources and would lead global energy systems of the 21st century back to the beginnings 
of the Industrial Revolution: to a coal-based economy. 
Scenarios of the Future 
Exactly 100 years ago, in April 1896, Svante Arrhenius published an article, "On 
the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground" [30]. 
It was the first comprehensive study to analyze the "greenhouse effect" and to assess 
the implications of elevated concentrations of C02 (carbonic acid in the terminology of 
Arrhenius) in the atmosphere. He quantified the C02 emissions quoting estimates of 
his colleague Prof. Hogborn indicating consumption o( some 500 million tons of coal 
worldwide (and assessed them to equal the carbon uptake by weathering of rocks) . The 
greenhouse effect and the potential of anthropogenic interference of C02 emissions from 
burning of fossil fuels are thus known to science for 100 years. (Cf. the discussion of 
"discovery by accident" versus an "attention management problem" by Tom Schelling 
and Harvey Brooks in this special issue.) 
What would have been Arrhenius' scenario for future increases in these anthropogenic 
emissions? We do not known, as the study (wisely perhaps) presented the calculations 
parametrically for a range of C02 concentration levels from 200 to 900 ppmv (parts per 
million by volume), compared to the then estimated prevailing level of about 300 ppmv. 
And 100 years later, C02 concentrations have reached 360 ppmv [2] and numerous scenar-
ios exist that attempt to project emission levels far out into the future. The IPCC (IS92 
series [31]) developed one of the most influential of these scenarios. 
Figure 5 summarizes the results of a recent evaluation of the IPCC scer]arios ((32] 
in [2]) comparing the carbon intensity of primary energy for the six IPCC scenarios 
(IS92a to IS92f) with the range from other scenarios published in the literature. The most 
significant finding for the IPCC scenarios is that after the middle of the 21st century 
carbon intensities stay constant for all of the six scenarios developed. This represents in 
our viewpoint a certain lack in scenario richness, especially in view of the stated purpose 
to explore a wide range of future possible developments through the scenario exercise. 
Figure 5 also shows the corresponding decarbonization trends of the recent scenarios of 
the World Energy Council (15] that try to capture a broader spectrum of future develop-
ments in the energy sector. There, only one scenario (A2) portrays a similar picture of 
stagnating improvements in decarbonization as depicted by the IPCC scenarios. 
The IS92 scenario assumptions of driving forces in the domain of energy technologies 
and resource availability appear restricted, especially when compared with the wide varia-
tion in input assumptions like population and economic growth. As a result, all of the 
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scenarios converge to quite similar long-term energy supply structures and hence to two 
clusters of carbon intensities, corresponding to the higher and the lower energy demand 
scenarios, respectively. A yet more pronounced scenario singularity can in fact also be 
observed for the geographical distribution of energy consumption (and emissions) in the 
IS92 scenario series (Table 4). Keeping in mind that scenarios are not intended as forecasts 
but rather are descriptions of alternative futures, it seems important to explore a wider 
spectrum of possibilities that illustrate possible tensions or congruences between economic 
development, energy consumption, and emissions on one side, and the preservation of 
the environment on the other. Technological change and changing consumer preferences 
TABLE 4 
Variations in the Basic Assumptions of the IPCC 1592 Scenarios (global data by 2100) 
Population Emissions "To Share of DCs "To Share of coal Carbon intensity 
(billions) (GtC) in energy in emissions (tC/toe) 
IS92a 11.3 19.8 66 87 0.57 
IS92b 11.3 18.6 68 93 0.55 
IS92c 6.4 4.6 62 69 0.36 
Is92d 6.4 9.9 67 84 0.33 
IS92e 11.3 34.9 69 81 0.59 
1S92f 17.6 25.9 65 84 0.64 
Range 6.4-17.6 4.6-34.9 62-69 69-93 0.33-0.64 
Minimum/maxim um 2.8 7.6 I.I 1.3 1.8 
Data source: Reference 31. 
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toward cleaner fuels that lead to decarbonization are certainly key parameters to explore 
in such future exercises. 
Conclusion 
The global energy system is decarbonizing, as measured by the reduction in the specific 
carbon emissions per unit of primary energy consumed. This trend appears continuous and 
persistent, albeit it proceeds at very slow rates of 0.30Jo per year. Should these historical 
trends continue, we might in fact be only half-way through the fossil fuel age that would 
draw to a close only late in the 22nd century. 
The driving forces of decarbonization include both continued technological change 
in all domains of energy production, conversion, and end use as well as the quest for 
higher flexibility, convenience, and cleanliness of energy services demanded by consumers, 
especially as incomes rise. To an extent the energy sector "compensates" some of the more 
pronounced decarbonization trends in energy end use, reflecting resource endowments, 
technology availability, geopolitical considerations, as well as policy influence. Neverthe-
less, decarbonization is a pervasive phenomenon also in energy supply and conversion. 
The long-term decarbonization trends indicate that the global energy system is moving 
in the right direction. This gives reason to be cautiously optimistic that development and 
the resulting economic growth, increased energy needs, and emissions could be reconciled 
with a precautionary policy of avoiding large-scale human interference with the climate 
system. The task of controlling energy-related carbon emissions, as daunting as it may 
appear from today's perspective, may in fact turn out to be less obstructive if indeed an 
acceleration of long-term structural change trends is called for rather than departure in 
an entirely new direction. 
Conversely, it will simply not suffice to rely on "autonomous" structural change 
toward carbon-freer energy systems, especially considering the slow historical rates of 
decarbonization of 0.30Jo per year. They are dwarfed by historical an anticipated future 
growth rates in energy use and resulting carbon emissions. Substantial acceleration of 
decarbonization would thus entail both ambitious technological and policy changes. 
Whereas such changes are inherently difficult to anticipate, it is also a matter of fact that 
historically it was precisely structural changes that enabled us to improve quality and 
quantity of energy services. Such structural changes are rarely represented in studies of 
energy-environment interactions. This suggests that decarbonization and its driving forces 
may still be insufficiently captured in most models and scenarios of the long-term evolution 
of the energy system. 
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